Journal Article

The case for NIT+FT in Europe. An empirical optimal taxation exercise

Publication details

Publication date
Published in
Economic Modelling
Volume
75
Pages
pp. 38–69
Publisher
Elsevier
ISSN
2649993

Summary

We present an exercise in empirical optimal taxation applied to a Negative Tax with Flat Tax reform for a sample of eight European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. Two popular approaches to empirical optimal taxation are the structural analytical approach and the non-tructural “sufficient statistics” approach. This paper presents a different approach that combines structural microeconometric modelling, behavioural microsimulation and numerical optimization. For each country, we estimate a microeconometric model of labour supply for both couples and singles. A procedure that simulates the households' choices under given tax-transfer rules is then embedded in a constrained optimization program in order to identify optimal rules under the public budget constraint. The optimality criterion is the class of Kolm's social welfare function. The tax-transfer rules considered as candidates are members of a class that includes as special cases various versions of the Negative Income Tax: Conditional (means-tested) Basic Income, Unconditional Basic Income, In-Work Benefits and General Negative Income Tax, combined with a Flat Tax above the exemption level. The analysis in most cases show that: the General Negative Income Tax strictly dominates the other rules, including the current ones; the Unconditional Basic Income policy is better than the Conditional Basic Income policy; Conditional Basic Income policy may lead to a significant reduction in labour supply and poverty-trap effects; In-Work-Benefit policy is strictly dominated by the General Negative Income Tax and by the Unconditional Basic Income. We also exemplify the possibility of identifying the mapping between the contry-specific “primitives” (social preferences, productivity, public budget constraint, labour supply elasticity and Gini coefficient) and the optimal tax-transfer rules.

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